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ABSTRACT 
 
Beginning in April 2010, a major exception to the age discrimination rubric was removed 
from the statute book.
1
 The default retirement age (DRA) had permitted employers to retire 
workers at 65,
2
 thus driving the proverbial coach and horses through the anti-discrimination 
principle. The repeal was effective from April 6, 2011, but there was a 6 month transitional 
period. Such retirements could continue until October 1, 2011, providing that due notice was 
given before April 6, and that the worker was 65 (or the normal retirement age) before 
October 1, 2011 (reg.5).  
 
This repeal will be welcomed by those approaching retirement age and arguably most in need 
of protection from age discrimination. The bad news for these workers is that employers may 
still force them to retire, although this time the employer must defend the retirement using 
either the standard Genuine Occupational Requirement, or (more likely) objective 
justification. 
 
An interesting aspect to statutory interpretation is absorbed by the objective justification 
defence. Domestic courts and tribunals have been directed (by the ECJ) to interpret an 
employer’s defence to age discrimination according to expressed government social policy. 
There are two twists in this process. First, government policy appears to be fluid. Second, it 
appears nowadays to be somewhat different from other ECJ and Court of Appeal 
pronouncements on the subject of compulsory retirement. This leaves courts and tribunals 
with the task of scouring various government statements for a social policy, and then 
deciding if it can be reconciled with judicial precedent. 
Drawing on the extensive legislative background, UK and ECJ case law, and observations 
from Canada, the United States, and Australia, this article explores and speculates when an 
employer may succeed in objectively justifying compulsory retirement. 
  
 
THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
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 The Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011/1069 
repealed Equality Act 2010, Sch.9, paras.8 and 9. 
2
 Or the employee’s ‘‘normal retirement age’’ if higher: ERA 1996 s.98ZC. 
Age discrimination was included in the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, and implemented 
in the UK by the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031, since  
superseded by the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010). 
 
Retirement is most likely to take the form of direct discrimination, as most retirements are 
directly linked to the age of the worker. Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 outlaws direct 
discrimination as less favourable treatment because of age. However, unique for direct age 
discrimination, s.13(2) provides a general ‘objective justification’ defence.  
 
At EU level, the Framework Directive 2000/78, art.2 outlaws differences in treatment 
because of age, but by art.6(1), adds a defence:  
 
 
‘... if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a 
legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational 
training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’ 
 
Article 6(1) proceeds to provide some rather generalised examples relating to: seniority of 
service; or the training of younger persons, or older persons with caring responsibilities, or 
those approaching retirement age. 
 
 
THE MEANING OF THE OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION DEFENCE 
 
The defence (in what is now EA 2010, s.13(2)) is usually reserved for indirect discrimination, 
and was challenged in the Age Concern case,
3
 for being incompatible with the parent 
‘Framework’ Directive 2000/78/EC, which, by art.6(1) (above), appeared to permit only 
specific defences to direct age discrimination. In this challenge, the ECJ ruled that the 
defence was compatible, but with the qualification that it could be used only to fulfil social 
policy aims, which were ‘distinguishable from purely individual reasons particular to the 
employer’s situation, such as cost reduction or improving competitiveness’. Citing art.6(1), 
the Court stated that these aims could be identified from the ‘general context’ of the specific 
section.
4
 
 
When the case returned to the High Court, now known as Age UK,
5
 Blake, J. found that the 
‘context’ from which the social policy aims could be found was the legislative background, 
including Explanatory Notes, the consultation process, and public debate.
6
 
 
Further, any defect in the defence as originally drafted could be cured by reading it down in 
light of the emerging ECJ case law.
7
 Blake, J. echoed the ECJ’s caution that there was a 
‘clear distinction’ between a government’s social policy and ‘individual business saying it is 
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cheaper to discriminate than to address the issues that the Directive requires to be 
addressed’.8 
 
This shows that the s.13(2) defence envisages factors quite different from those expected to 
satisfy the objective justification defence for indirect discrimination, where employers 
normally put forward job-related reasons. Where the aim of direct discrimination is job-
related, the employer may be able to justify it as a General Occupational Requirement 
(GOR), under EA 2010, Sch.9, para.1 (corresponding to Framework Directive, art.4). 
 
 
 (a) The context and social policy 
 
One rather technical potential problem remains when trying to discern the social policy. 
Much of the legislative background related to the now-defunct default retirement age (DRA), 
which was introduced with the Age Regulations 2006. Of course, it would be sensible to use 
this background for the present purpose, as it related to compulsory retirement. Accordingly, 
in Age UK, Blake, J. was content to combine the social policy evidence behind both the 
objective justification defence and the DRA,
9
 and there seems no reason to change that 
approach now. From 2010, there was another flurry of documents produced by the Coalition 
Government relating directly to objectively justifying retirement. Overall, the main sources 
appear to be:
10
 
 
 
 2003 Consultation: ‘Age Matters – Consultation 2003’.11 
 2005 Consultation: ‘Equality and diversity: coming of age. Consultation on the draft 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006’.12 
 Explanatory Notes to the 2006 Age Regulations.13 
 DTI Evidence given in Age UK.14  
 2010 ‘Employment and Skills Guidebook’ (2010 – ‘Business Link’). 
 2010 Consultation: Phasing Out the Default Retirement Age.15 
 2011 Consultation Response.16 
 2011 Age Positive: Workforce Management without a Fixed Retirement Age.17 
 2011 ACAS Guidance for Employers: Working Without the Default Retirement 
Age.
18
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Prior to 2010, the documents produced two themes of social policy: ‘workforce planning’ and 
‘avoiding an adverse impact on the provision of occupational pensions and other work-related 
benefits.’19 These were adopted by Blake, J.in Age UK.20 It will become apparent that the 
Coalition Government has varied this somewhat. 
 
 
 (b) A Wide discretion? 
 
Most of the case law so far on retirement is evaluating whether domestic legislation which 
facilitates compulsory retirement is compatible with the Framework Directive. This is a 
slightly different task from asking whether an individual employer can justify compulsory 
retirement. The task is rather awkward because social policy aims are chosen by governments 
and not by any individual employer. Further, Member States have a ‘wide discretion’ in 
choosing the means to achieve the aims (such as retirement).
21
 However, it seems that 
employers will enjoy ‘a certain degree of flexibility’ in choosing the means in pursuit of the 
established social policy aims.
22
 Although this was tempered somewhat by Blake, J. in Age 
UK, stating that: ‘the individual employer ... has a much more rigorous task’ than the State 
had in justifying the inclusion of the defence [of objective justification].
23
 
 
There is little case law on objectively justifying any particular retirement, because, until its 
repeal, employers generally have used the DRA. There is one Court of Appeal decision. 
Other judicial guidance can be drawn from the ECJ pronouncements, and some observations 
from North American and Australian cases. 
 
To justify a retirement under EA 2010 s.13(2), an employer must show that the retirement 
had a legitimate aim, and then that the means of achieving that aim was appropriate and 
necessary (‘proportionality’). 
 
 (c) Unfair dismissal 
 
Without the DRA, a worker forced to retire is likely to claim unfair dismissal in addition to 
age discrimination. The Government indicated it expects employers who objectively justify 
the retirement to be able to defend a parallel unfair dismissal claim as ‘some other substantial 
reason’ under s.98(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996).24 
 
 
THE LEGITIMATE AIMS 
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The first proposition to emerge from the leading UK retirement case is that the employer 
need not have adopted its retirement policy with a social policy aim in mind. The aim passes 
muster if it is consistent with a recognised social policy: Seldon v Clarkson, Wright & 
Jakes.
25
 It follows that an employer may plead after the event that its aim was a social aim.
26
 
This may produce problems where the employer is also defending a claim of unfair dismissal, 
where the fairness of the dismissal must be judged by what was known to the employer at the 
time of the dismissal.
27
 
 
What follows is a consideration of a number of potentially legitimate aims. 
 
 (a) Workforce planning 
 
For the DRA, the Government sub-divided its workforce planning aim into three: (i) planning 
against a known attrition profile; (ii) ‘job-blocking’; and (iii) encouraging pension 
provision.
28
 
 
 (i) Planning against a known attrition profile 
 
One of the documents explained that: ‘for employers, being able to rely on a set retirement 
age allows the recruitment, training and development of employees, and the planning of wage 
structures and occupational pensions, against a known attrition profile.’29 
 
(ii) ‘Job-blocking’ 
 
The problem of job-blocking was addressed in Seldon v Clarkson (above). Here, a partner in 
a firm of solicitors challenged compulsory retirement of partners aged 65. (The case was 
decided under the objective justification defence because the DRA did not apply to partners.) 
Three aims were cited by the firm. The first was ‘ensuring associates were given the 
opportunity of partnership after a reasonable period’. The second was ‘facilitating the 
planning of the partnership and workforce across individual departments by having a realistic 
long-term expectation as to when vacancies will arise’. These closely connected aims, known 
indelicately as dead man’s shoes, were held by the Court of Appeal to coincide with the 
social policy of improving employment and promotion prospects of young people.
30
 
 
However, the Coalition Government has since changed this stance: 
 
‘Older workers do not tend to block opportunities for younger workers. Evidence indicates 
that there was no positive effect on youth employment from measures which allowed older 
workers to retire early.’31 
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It would seem from this that job-blocking may no longer be considered a public policy aim, 
and that this aspect of Seldon is no longer good law. In substance, there may be little 
difference between the ‘job-blocking’ and ‘attrition profile’ policies. And it could turn out 
that the lawfulness of identical retirement practices depends on the label they are given. 
Employers are more likely to succeed if they emphasize that the purpose of the retirement 
policy relates to matters such as recruitment, training, employee-development, wage 
structures, and occupational pensions, rather the than job and promotion prospects for 
younger people. 
  
 (iii) Encouraging pension provision 
 
A further aspect of workforce planning was that a definite retirement date would: 
 
 ‘encourage employees to save now and make provision for their retirement, and avoid them 
putting off career and pension planning on the assumption that they will be able to continue 
working indefinitely.’32  
 
More recent Coalition Government guidance suggests a drift away from this policy. The 2010 
Employment and Skills Guidebook notes that: 
 
‘The State Pension age is not a “retirement age” - older workers can carry on working past 
their State Pension age, and continue to work while claiming their State Pension. 
Alternatively, they can defer claiming their State Pension for at least a year in return for 
either an enhanced pension, or a lump sum when they do decide to claim’.33 
 
A similar fluidity is envisaged for occupational pensions. Where they do not already cater for 
members working beyond the scheme’s normal retirement age, employers are encouraged to 
review the terms with the scheme’s managers.34 
 
The 2010 Guidebook observes that workers are notified by the state and/or workplace 
pension scheme as they approach the state/scheme retirement age. ‘These notifications help 
to prompt older workers to consider their options for retirement or working on.’35 
 
It appears that Government policy has moved on from ‘planning for a definite retirement 
date’ to ‘considering your options after a nominal retirement date’. Workers are now treated 
responsible enough to consider and plan their future without regulatory encouragement. This 
dilutes – if not extinguishes – any social policy associated with encouraging pension 
provision. This should not disturb the legitimate aim of employers planning for pension 
provision against a known attrition profile ((i) above). 
 
(b) Stability of pension scheme  
 
Where the employer’s pension scheme is less amenable to flexible retirement dates, it might 
be that an individual employer wishes to ‘preserve its stability’ with a compulsory retirement 
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age. Blake, J. recognised this as a social policy aim in Age UK.
36
 Back in 2004, the 
Government underpinned its DRA policy thus: 
  
‘Furthermore, ... if all employers only had the option of individually justified 
retirement ages at the time the legislation was introduced, this could risk adverse 
consequences for occupational pension schemes and other work related benefits. 
Some employers would instead simply reduce or remove benefits they offer to 
employees to offset the increase in costs.’37 
 
It would seem that where the employer and/or pension scheme managers persevere with a 
less flexible scheme, this aim is legitimate. 
 
(c) ‘Dignity’  
 
The third aim in Seldon v Clarkson was ‘limiting the need to expel partners by way of 
performance management, thus contributing to the congenial and supportive culture in the 
firm’. Giving judgment for the Court, Waller, LJ said that this aim of ‘collegiality’ was 
‘intended to produce a happy work place ... [M]y experience would tell me that it is a 
justification for having a cut-off age that people will be allowed to retire with dignity.’ This 
was held again to coincide with the government's social policy aims.
38
 
 
This aim was trumpeted often by employers during the build up to the 2006 Regulations, and 
appeared in the Government’s 2003 Consultation,39 but not as any part of its social policy. 
The document merely reported what some employers stated to be the reasoning behind their 
compulsory retirement policies. No further mention of this was made in the 2005 
Consultation
40
 and subsequent 2006 Explanatory Notes. This ‘dignity’ aim was advanced also 
in the Age UK case,
41
 but rejected as a social policy aim by Blake, J.
42
 In fact, he considered 
that compulsory retirement of those wishing to continue in work had an ‘adverse impact on 
the dignity of autonomy of members of this class’.43 
 
This leaves Waller’s LJ ‘experience’ as the only basis of the ‘dignity’ aim. With due respect, 
it is not for a judge to create social policy, and as such, this aim would appear to lack 
credibility. Moreover, in its 2011 Consultation Response, the Government stated that a strong 
link between age and job performance was a ‘myth’ for most types of work: ‘We believe that 
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employers should assess the performance of their staff fairly, whatever an employee’s age’.44 
Accordingly, its 2011 ‘Age Positive’ Guidance suggests that employers should:  
 
‘Encourage an open culture of active performance management, formal or informal, 
throughout workers’ careers to avoid unexpected announcements, confrontations or “loss of 
dignity”’.45 
 
And where poor performance cannot be resolved - by say, training, a change of job role, 
workplace adaptation or a change in working pattern -  then the employer should ‘follow  the 
normal fair dismissal procedures that apply to employees of any age’.46 In other words, the 
particular worker should be dismissed for ‘capability’ (under ERA 1996, s.98(2)(a)), and not 
for retirement. This all confirms that ‘dignity’ or ‘collegiality’ theories are not part of the 
Government’s social policy. On the contrary, the Government’s view is that dignity is 
preserved by performance management. 
 
The Coalition Government’s reference to ‘most types of work’ leaves the door ajar for forced 
retirement in some cases. It would seem that the employer would have to show a strong link 
between performance and age, and that evaluating performance is not possible, or perhaps 
not practicable. 
 
 
(d) Health and safety  
(i)  Physical fitness 
 
For certain types of work, this is the most obvious reason for employers to set a retirement 
age. Recital 18 of the Framework Directive identifies as a legitimate aim the ‘operational 
capacity’ of the armed forces, police, prison, or emergency services. In Wolf,47 the challenged 
rule barred recruitment into the fire service of anyone over 30. This was to allow sufficient 
time for training, as fire fighters were retired from fire fighting duties at age 45. And this was 
because, agreed the ECJ, ‘very few officials over 45 years of age have sufficient physical 
capacity to perform the fire-fighting part of their activities’.48 Accordingly, the ECJ reasoned, 
the rule was justified as a GOR. There was no need to find a social policy required by the 
objective justification defence. 
 
A notable feature of this case was that the job requirement in question was an age limit, not 
fitness per se. Nonetheless, the ECJ accepted age as the job requirement, noting ‘scientific 
data deriving from studies in the field of industrial and sports medicine which show that 
respiratory capacity, musculature and endurance diminish with age’.49 Hence, age was so 
closely related to job-performance it was a job requirement. This is a rather startling 
conclusion, given that exceptions to the principle of equal treatment are usually interpreted 
strictly.
50
 However, it may not have serious ramifications for retirement. Employers at the 
recruitment stage have to predict the physical fitness of recruits over a considerable length of 
                                                 
44
 p.7. 
45
 Age Positive, p.12. 
46
 pp.12-13. 
47
 Case C-229/08, [2010] IRLR 244. 
48
 Ibid, [41]. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 e.g. Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2006] 1 CMLR 43, [65]. 
time, conceivably decades. This is less likely to be the case in retirement cases, which would 
undermine somewhat the legitimacy of the aim. And even if the aim were considered 
legitimate, an age limit would be harder to prove proportionate where individual testing was 
available (see further below, under Proportionality). That said, Wolf signals that the ECJ 
willingly accepts generalisations about job performance and age. 
 
 (ii) Protection of the public 
 
In Petersen,
51
 one of the aims of German legislation retiring dentists when they reached 68 
was ‘The protection of the health of patients as performance of dentists declines after a 
certain age’. The ECJ considered that this aim fell readily within art.2(5) of the Framework 
Directive which provides: ‘This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down 
by national law which ... are necessary ... for the protection of health...’ As such, the Court 
had no need to consider whether the health of patients fell within the general objective 
justification defence of art.6(1). 
 
The Equality Act 2010 has no provision corresponding to art.2(5). An employer using health 
and safety aims to retire older workers could try to argue this as a GOR (citing Wolf, above). 
Should this fail (distinguishing Wolf as a recruitment case) the employer would have to look 
to the objective justification defence.  
 
Although ‘health and safety’ did not appear as a social policy aim back in 2006, the Coalition 
has since mentioned it (albeit in passing) as one in its 2010 and 2011 Consultation 
documents.
52
 Thus, it may be added to the Government’s ‘pension stability’ and remaining 
‘workforce planning’ social policy aims and used as a legitimate aim for the objective 
justification defence. ‘Health and safety’ presumably covers that of the individual employees, 
their colleagues, and the public. 
 
 
 
(e) Reducing or redistributing unemployment  
 
In Palacios de la Villa,
53
 the ECJ accepted a goal of ‘checking unemployment’ as a legitimate 
basis for Spanish legislation permitting compulsory retirement to be negotiated into collective 
agreements.
54
 
 
Again, we see a more relaxed judicial approach to age discrimination. ‘Checking 
unemployment’ is a triumph of form over substance; in fact, such policies merely redistribute 
it, from the young to the old. Redefining older unemployed people as ‘retired’ cannot change 
this.  
 
This criticism was neutered by the ECJ in Petersen (above), where the second aim cited for 
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retiring dentists at 68 was ‘the distribution of employment opportunities among the 
generations’. The Court cited Palacios de la Villa, and held: 
 
‘Similarly, a measure intended to promote the access of young people to the profession of 
dentist in the panel system may be regarded as an employment policy measure’.55  
 
Similarly, in Rosenbadt, the ECJ observed: 
 
‘The termination of the employment contracts of those [aged 65] directly benefits young 
workers by making it easier for them to find work, which is otherwise difficult at a time of 
chronic unemployment’.56 
 
Thus, it seems, ‘redistributing employment’ is a legitimate aim under the Framework 
Directive. However, it does not appear in any of the Consultation documents nor Explanatory 
Notes. Moreover, the 2011 Consultation Response takes quite the opposite stance. In its 
forward, the Government declares: 
 
‘Working longer is good for the economy, for society and for individuals. Evidence shows 
that keeping more people in work helps the economy grow. ...   We want employers to draw 
their workforces from the widest possible talent pool ....We believe strongly in the freedom of 
people to work on for as long as they want and are able to.’ 
 
So, for reasons of economic growth and individual justice, the Coalition Government set 
itself dead against using retirement as a means to reduce unemployment or favouring 
employment of the young over the old. 
 
This stance hints at a technical problem for the aim ‘redistributing employment’. Favouring 
young persons over the old amounts to positive action, which normally requires a specific 
legislative sanction. Further, the concept of positive action has its roots in redressing historic 
disadvantage. The principal purpose of anti-age discrimination law is to address entrenched 
discrimination against the elderly. This aim does quite the opposite. It is akin to sanctioning 
positive action in favour of men, or whites. The Canadian Supreme Court has observed that 
such a redistributive aim: 
 
‘assumes that the continued employment of some individuals is less important to those 
individuals, and of less value to society at large, than is the employment of other individuals, 
solely on the basis of age’.57  
 
Clearly, aims of reducing or redistributing unemployment by retirement form no part of 
present Government social policy. 
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(f) Costs?  
 
There could be many savings that come with an employer’s compulsory retirement age. A 
rather obvious move by some employers, especially in hard times, is to retire ‘expensive’ 
older workers and replace them with younger cheaper ones. This could arise where, say, the 
employer historically has rewarded long-service, or operates an incremental scale 
(automatically promoting workers up a pay scale each year). Rather than upset this 
arrangement openly, an employer may preserve or manoeuvre its retirement policy to offset 
the expense.  
 
Authority has it for sex discrimination that costs alone cannot be relied on as an aim. In 
Redcar v Bainbridge,
58
 an equal pay case, Elias, J. said that ‘an employer cannot defeat the 
right to equality by pointing to financial burdens alone, but he can pray the financial burdens 
in aid as some support for a decision which is objectively justified on other grounds.’59 
Similarly, in Pulham v Barking & Dagenham LB,
60
 the EAT suggested that an ‘exhausted’ 
budget could be a factor (it would be ‘unexceptional’) in the proportionality analysis, but not, 
in itself, a reason to justify age discrimination, because the employer was responsible for 
allocating the budget in the first place.
61
 
 
This suggests that costs per se cannot be used as a legitimate aim, although it could form part 
of the proportionality argument. But in Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust,
62
 a case of 
direct age discrimination, the EAT suggested otherwise. Here, a chief executive was made 
redundant for two reasons: 
 
(1) to get him off the payroll before he reached 50, when he would have been entitled 
to early retirement, costing at least £500,000; and  
 
(2) he was redundant (and been kept on for one year doing very little). 
 
It was held that the redundancy alone validated the dismissal. However, Underhill, J. went on 
to suggest that where the discriminatory impact was ‘trivial’ and the cost of the alternative 
‘enormous’, costs alone ought to be able to justify age discrimination.63 This ignores, of 
course, the ECJ and High Court caution in the Age Concern case (see above) that objective 
justification could not be used to reduce an individual employer’s costs or increase its 
competitiveness. 
 
A third aim argued in Petersen (above) was that in Germany there were too many dentists on 
the public panel, and this threatened the financial stability of the public health care system. It 
seems that this third aim - ‘financial constraints’ - was a legitimate aim, because it accorded 
with the ‘public health’ purpose. However, this can be distinguished from Woodcock and the 
like, because it fell under the public health exception in art.2(5). It was not an individual 
employer merely saving money to remain competitive or increase profits. And so, it might be 
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that where an individual employer tries to justify retirement with the aim of saving money, 
the argument would be rejected. 
 
With these potential difficulties, the employer wishing to retire older expensive workers in 
order to replace them with younger ones would be well-advised to declare the apparently 
legitimate aim under the ‘attrition profile’ strand of the workforce planning policy (above), 
only mentioning the savings as part of its proportionality argument. Of course, fallacious or 
pretextual arguments proffered here should be rejected. In Petersen, the ECJ rejected the 
‘protection of the public’ argument (above) because the rule applied only to public sector 
dentists, and so lacked credibility.
64
 
 
 (g) The needs of the business 
 
Rather curiously, the Coalition Government has stated that in order to objectively justify a 
retirement ‘an employer would need to show that they were acting to further a legitimate aim 
of the business ...’65  
 
Taken at face value, this cannot be correct. A purely business aim was rejected by the ECJ 
and accordingly by the High Court in Age UK, as noted above.
66
 Any business aim would 
have to, at the least, coincide with a social policy aim (see Seldon v Clarkson, above).
67
 
 
 
  
OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
In sum, it seems that the most likely aims to be accepted are workforce planning (‘attrition 
profile’) and, where appropriate, pension stability or health and safety. Once the aim is 
established, the focus moves to proportionality: was the compulsory retirement an appropriate 
and necessary means to achieve the given aim? As noted above,
68
 employers may find that 
tribunals afford them ‘a certain degree of flexibility’ in choosing the means to achieve the 
aim. 
 
 
 (a) Choice of Age 
 
The choice of a particular retirement age would seem the most vulnerable target for 
claimants. The question will be just how much proof an employer can be expected to produce 
to show that its chosen age is necessary to achieve the aim. In Age UK, the High Court 
criticised the Government for not choosing a default retirement age above 65, say 68, and but 
for the Government’s forthcoming review (which led to the abolition of the DRA), it would 
have held that the age of 65 to be disproportionate to the twin aims of workforce planning 
and stability of pensions. In particular: 
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‘It creates greater discriminatory effect than is necessary on a class of people who both are 
able to and want to continue in their employment. A higher age would not have any general 
detrimental labour market consequences or block access to high level jobs by future 
generations’.69 
 
Elsewhere, Blake, J. observed that employers would have ‘a much more rigorous task’ than 
the State when objectively justifying individual practices.
70
 
 
However, the judicial indications elsewhere are that not much proof, if any, will be required, 
especially if employers align the retirement age with a norm, typically the state pension age. 
The ECJ, in Palacios de la Villa, Petersen, Rosenbadt, and Georgiev,
71
 and the Court of 
Appeal in Seldon, displayed little scrutiny of the employer’s chosen age. In the most pertinent 
of these cases, Seldon, where an employer (not the State) was charged with justifying a 
retirement age of 65, the Court of Appeal appeared notably relaxed about the choice of age. 
Waller, LJ reasoned: 
 
‘A rule which adopts 66 is less discriminatory to partners aged 65, but is now more 
discriminatory to partners aged 66. The selection of any age is going to be more 
discriminatory to that age. If that makes the rule unlawful, it would simply be impossible to 
justify a retirement age introduced with those aims’.72  
 
Inevitably, the Court of Appeal held that the age of 65 was proportionate, even after 
conceding that there was no evidence to show things would have been different if the chosen 
age were 68, 65, or 63. The decision was supported, Waller, LJ continued, by the 
Government’s choice of 65 as the DRA.73 
 
The Court’s reasoning appears to be rooted in a head-to-head comparison between two 
workers, respectively aged 65 and 66, when the retirement age is either 66 or 65. The 66 
year-old can complain he was treated less favourably than the 65 year-old or vice versa. This 
misses the point, which is achieving the least discriminatory means to achieve the aim. As 
such, any comparison should be (hypothetically) between 65 and 66 where both were 
retirement ages. This reveals it would be less discriminatory to retire the older worker 
because he would have one more year in employment and one year less unemployed or 
perhaps employed doing less desirable work.  
 
Regardless of this criticism, Seldon may be distinguished because the DRA has been repealed 
(no longer giving support to 65 as ‘a norm’), and that its aims (‘job-blocking’ and ‘dignity’), 
to which the logic was attached, no longer form part of social policy.  
 
 
 (i) Job performance generalisations 
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For aims more related to a specific job, the ECJ has readily accepted the generalisation that 
there is a strong relationship between advancing age and declining ability. In Petersen, the 
ECJ accepted the proposition that there was a decline in performance of dentists once past 
68.
74
  
 
The Canadian Supreme Court agrees:  
 
‘To begin with there is nothing inherent in most of the specified grounds of discrimination, 
e.g., race, colour, religion, national or ethnic origin, or sex that supports any general 
correlation between those characteristics and ability. But that is not the case with age. There 
is a general relationship between advancing age and declining ability’.75 
 
This is also the view of the United States Supreme Court. In Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v Murgia,
76
 the Court, when sanctioning the retirement of uniformed police 
officers at 50, did so on the basis that ‘there is a general relationship between advancing age 
and decreasing physical ability to respond to the demands of the job’.77 
 
However, present Government policy does not buy into this apparent received wisdom. It 
considers this generalisation to be a ‘myth’.78 In support, the Government relies on evidence 
that ‘productivity does not usually decline at least up to 70 years old - notably where older 
workers receive the same levels of training as younger workers’.79 This view contained the 
single caveat of referring to most jobs. Hence, employers may still use this generalisation, but 
only where they show the link between age and performance for that particular work, and the 
aim coincides with a social policy. As such, this may be argued as a GOR (Wolf) and/or as 
objectively justified. 
 
The most obvious basis for this generalisation coinciding with social policy is health and 
safety. 
 
 (ii) Health and safety 
 
It was noted above that the ECJ in Wolf and Petersen were prepared to accept generalisations 
on ability and age. It remains to be seen if the UK courts will accept such a generalisation at 
the point of retirement. Here, there could be workers who are physically fit, or able enough, 
for the job at the time of their dismissal. Of course, this possibility did not trouble the United 
States Supreme Court in Murgia (above). By contrast, a notable Australian decision rejected 
such a generalisation. In Bradley,
80
 the Army required trainee pilots to be aged between 19 
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and 28 because inter alia the job required ‘an ability to maintain a high level of medical 
fitness for the duration of the six-year period of appointment’. It was held that the physical 
fitness requirement could not be allowed to ‘have the effect of damning individuals over 28 
years by reference to a stereotypical characteristic (inferior physical fitness) of their age 
group’.81 The logic of this recruitment case applies with all the more force to retirement.  
 
Of course, such a generalisation would be unacceptable if based on other protected 
characteristics. It may be true to say that women are, in general, physically weaker than men. 
But no court would sanction the exclusion of all women from a job demanding physical 
strength. Here, employers should assess each candidate according to his or her physical 
strength. 
 
(b) Link with pension  
 
A factor in Palacios de la Villa was that workers could only be retired (aged 65) if they had 
sufficient pension contribution. This mitigated the discriminatory impact of the policy and so 
assisted the (successful) proportionality argument.
82
 This suggests that tying their retirement 
policy to pension entitlement (be it state or otherwise) would help employers justify the 
policy. 
 
 (c) Consent  
 
Another factor for the ECJ in Palacios de la Villa was that the Spanish legislation permitted 
compulsory retirement only via a collective agreement. The evidence of the challenged law 
being made with the instigation, or cooperation, of trade unions and employers’ groups 
clearly influenced the Court.
83
 
 
Several interesting observations on this matter arose in the Canadian Supreme Court case, 
McKinney v University of Guelph.
84
 Here, some university academics, aggrieved at a 
compulsory retirement age (65) in their collective agreement, claimed that the facilitating 
legislation, s.9(a), Ontario Human Rights Code 1981, which excluded those aged over 65 
from protection under the Code’s age discrimination prohibition, violated the non-
discrimination tenet in s.15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In rejecting the claims 
(by a 5-2 majority), La Forest, J. proclaimed: 
 
‘The freedom of employers and employees to determine conditions of the workplace for 
themselves through a process of bargaining is a very desirable goal in a free society.’85 
 
It was noted also that the local union, as well as the labour movement generally, opposed 
McKinney’s claim.86 
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 Concurring, Sopinka, J. considered that that were the claim to succeed, the Charter ‘would be 
used to restrict the freedom of many in order to promote the interests of the few’.87 
Meanwhile, Cory, J. (concurring) observed: 
 
‘Bargains struck whereby higher wages are paid at an earlier age in exchange for mandatory 
retirement at a fixed and certain age, may well confer a very real benefit upon the worker and 
not in any way affect his or her basic dignity or sense of worth. If such contracts should be 
found to be invalid, it would attack the very foundations of collective bargaining and might 
well put in jeopardy some of the hard won rights of labour’.88 
 
By contrast, the statutory exception under the United States federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act 1967 is based entirely on individual consent.
89
 
 
A factor in Seldon was the individual consent given by an informed person when he signed 
the (law firm) partnership agreement. The Court of Appeal concluded that there are situations 
where ‘it is legitimate to take into account the perception which the partner now challenging 
the clause had at one time’.90   
 
But there are various degrees of consent. The bargaining power of a job applicant can vary 
enormously. For most, there is no choice. Jobs are offered on a take-it-or-leave basis. This 
will be all the more so in times of chronic unemployment (ironically a situation the ECJ in 
Rosenbadt used to justify compulsory retirement of cleaners).
91
 A trade union member may 
have a diluted influence over a collective agreement, whilst a non-member is likely to have 
none. There is all the difference between an informed professional entering into a partnership 
agreement and one of these workers, whose consent is largely illusory. 
 
However, the overwhelming majority of a workforce may support a compulsory retirement 
age negotiated into a collective agreement, especially when it was linked to other benefits. 
Similarly, a highly skilled individual, with legal advice, may negotiate a detailed package, 
which included a retirement age. In either case, as long as the employer can produce an aim 
that coincides with social policy (most likely workforce planning), consent is likely prove a 
persuasive argument in justification.  
 
The cases show that the judiciary of Europe and North America are content to have the 
fundamental right to equality trumped by freedom of contract, majority rule, or bargained 
away with work-related benefits. This exposes something quite odd about compulsory 
retirement: for many workers (perhaps a majority of the nation’s workforce) it is desirable. 
Its discriminatory nature is less important than the perceived benefits, making justification all 
the easier. This certainly encouraged the Canadian Supreme Court. That said, for other 
protected characteristics, such as race or sex, no such sympathy is likely to be shown for 
discrimination arising from agreement of any kind.
92
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 (d)  Costs 
 
It was noted above
93
 that the EAT constantly has stated that employer’s costs may form part 
of its proportionality argument, if not the mainstay aim. Thus, it seems, an employer retiring 
workers under any of the legitimate aims highlighted above, could deploy financial savings in 
its proportionality argument. 
 
 (e) Stability of pension scheme 
 
Where the aim is the stability of pensions, the employer would have to show that compulsory 
retirement was an appropriate means to achieve the aim. This matter was discussed at length 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in McKinney (above). The majority’s rejection of the claim 
was that a general retirement age of 65 was necessary to preserve the stability and integrity of 
pension schemes. They relied on the defendant’s experts, who testified:  
 
‘In short, a number of issues regarding the design of occupational pension plans 
would have to be addressed if mandatory retirement were not permitted. So, too, 
would the wage policy followed by many employers, especially when the pension 
benefit is linked to the employee’s earnings. The use of the occupational pension plan 
as a vehicle for deferring a portion of the employee’s total compensation to the 
employee’s later work years may be reduced. As before, not permitting mandatory 
retirement is likely to require compensating adjustments elsewhere in the 
compensation package and in the set of work rules that govern the workplace.’94 
 
The plaintiff’s expert confined his evidence to effect upon pension plans of removing the 
Mandatory Retirement Age (MRA). He highlighted the experiences of Quebec and Manitoba, 
where the MRA was removed and no ‘instability’ was apparent in the pension plans as a 
result. He testified that deferred retirement would invoke some administrative costs for 
actuarial adjustments, which would ‘pale into insignificance compared to administrative costs 
resulting from pension legislation.’ Second, he noted that the removal of the MRA did not 
necessarily alter the normal retiring age in the pension plan. In Quebec and Manitoba, for 
example, legislation required that a normal retiring age be stated in the pension plan.
95
 In 
other words, the pension matures at a certain date irrespective of whether the worker retires. 
The worker draws the pension, and may continue working with the option of contributing 
further to a pension plan. 
 
The case demonstrates the judiciary’s deference to legislation that derogates from the anti-
discrimination principle when the treatment is ageist. Faced with divided expert evidence, the 
majority sided with the defendant. Given that the UK Coalition Government has not 
absolutely ruled this out as an aim, the remaining issues would be whether compulsory 
retirement was an appropriate means, and whether the chosen age was necessary. On the first 
issue at least, it seems that the employer has a ‘certain degree of flexibility’.96 It remains to be 
seen whether tribunals show the deference afforded by the Canadian Supreme Court. 
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 OTHER AGE DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES IN THE ECJ  
 
In Mangold v Helm,
97
 German law exempted from regulation fixed-term employment 
contracts for any worker over 52. This relaxation of protective legislation was designed to 
encourage employers to recruit older workers. The ECJ held that this was a legitimate aim, 
but went beyond what was appropriate and necessary to help unemployed older workers.
98
 In 
Swedex,
99
 a rule discounting for notice periods the time employed before the age of 25 was 
challenged. The ECJ held that the aim (‘facilitating younger persons’ recruitment’) was 
legitimate, but again, as the rule affected all workers who began work before the age of 25, 
and as it affected young workers unequally (many, after extensive education and/or training, 
would not begin work until aged 25), it was not an appropriate means to achieve the aim.
100
  
 
These two cases indicate a marked contrast to the light touch taken by the ECJ in the 
retirement discrimination cases. If a pattern could be discerned, it seems that the ECJ shows 
great deference to retirement policies, accept generalisations about older workers’ job 
performance, and workers consent (even if largely illusory), but otherwise it will apply the 
orthodox strict justification test. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ECJ has ruled that the objective justification defence to direct age discrimination may be 
deployed only in pursuit of a social policy aim, which may be gleaned from the context of the 
legislation. Governments – but not employers – have a wide discretion in choosing these 
aims, although it seems, employers may have a ‘a certain degree of flexibility’ in choosing 
the means to achieve the aims. But whether employers can justify aims that inadvertently 
coincide with social policy, especially after the event, remains to be seen as employers defend 
parallel unfair dismissal claims. The ECJ has signalled a light-touch approach to retirement, 
and this echoes the North American judicial approach. The embryonic UK case law is rather 
split, with the High Court in Age UK suggesting a rather strict approach and the Court of 
Appeal in Seldon doing just the opposite. 
However, the Coalition Government has indicated that it no longer wants a fixed retirement 
age to be the norm. This is the ‘context’ of the repeal of the DRA, and consequent exposure 
of compulsory retirement to the objective justification. It remains to be seen just how far 
tribunals depart from the established ‘light touch’ pattern in the case law and follow instead 
the stricter approach suggested by this new context. On this note, it would have been helpful 
for the Government to have provided more clarity on its social policy aims (e.g. declaring the 
aims accepted in Seldon no longer valid). 
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